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ARTICLE

DEATH WITH DIGNITY IN MONTANA
James E. Dallner 1 and D. Scott Manning2

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Do Montanans have a right to medical assistancein dying?
Under Montana's constitution, a terminally ill Montanan
may have a right to medical assistance in intentionally hastening death. Such a right has not been found under the United
States Constitution, but may arise under state law. 3 The right
in Montana may arise under two separate sections of Article II
of the Montana Constitution: section 10, right of privacy and
section 4, individual dignity. 4 The argument that such a right
arises under the right of privacy has been thoroughly discussed
by Scott A. Fisk in his article The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Montana's Constitutional Right to

1. B.S. University of Montana, School of Business, 2002; expected J.D. University of
Montana, School of Law, 2005.
2. Practices law in Missoula, Montana.
3. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997).
4. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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PersonalAutonomy Privacy.5 A fundamental right is implicated
under either the individual dignity or right to privacy sections of
the Montana Constitution which requires that legislation regulating the right must be justified by a compelling state interest
and narrowly tailored to effectuate only that interest. 6 It is
unlikely that current Montana statutes regulating medical assistance in hastening death would pass this strict scrutiny test.
Thus, the current laws may be vulnerable to challenge.
This article will discuss the right of a terminally ill Montanan to medical assistance in hastening death by first providing a general background. Second, this article will review the
right to medical assistance in hastening death under the United
States Constitution. Third, it will review the argument that this
right arises under the right to privacy section of the Montana
Constitution. Finally, it will discuss the argument that the
right also arises under the individual dignity section of the Montana Constitution.
B. Background and Significance
During the past century, advances in public health and
medicine have led to dramatic changes in the health, life expectancy and death processes of Americans. Social and legal conventions from earlier times have strained to respond to unprecedented and unforeseen developments. Since 1900, the average
life span of an American has increased by more than thirty
years. 7 On average, a 65-year-old person in 2000 could expect to
live to be nearly 83.1 years old; an 85-year-old in 2000 could ex-

pect to live to be over

90.8

This increase in longevity has been accompanied by the
emergence of long-term, chronic disease as the major pattern of
death. 9 At the beginning of the century communicable diseases

5. Scott A. Fisk, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Montana'sConstitutionalRight to PersonalAutonomy Privacy, 59 MONT. L. REV. 301 (1998).
6. See, e.g., State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 263, 934 P.2d 176, 184 (1997). Siegal
provides an articulation of the strict scrutiny test in Montana.
7. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Ten Great Public Health Achievements-United States, 1900-1999, 48 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 241 (1999).
8. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, National Center of Health Statistics, Health, United States, 2002 with Chartbook on Trends in the Health of Americans
(2002), availableat http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus02.pdf.
9. Anne M. Wilkinson & Joanne Lynn, Death Isn't What it Used to Be-A Proposal
for Medicaring:An Innovative Model of Care for the Last Phase Life, 12 N.A.E.L.A. Q. 12
(Summer 1999).
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were the leading causes of death; death was typically a relatively rapid process and could occur at any age. 10 Now 80% of
deaths result from a chronic, non-communicable illness." Unlike earlier times, most of us will die slowly.
Society and the legal system have struggled to respond to
this shifting paradigm of dying. The case of Karen Ann Quinlan 12 drew attention to the issue of the withdrawal of life support from a person in a persistent vegetative state. The New
Jersey Supreme Court consented to Quinlan's father's request
that her respirator be turned off.' 3 In re Quinlan was the first
in a series of cases defining the rights of terminally ill patients
14
and their families.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,1 5 the
United States Supreme Court discussed the right to withdraw
life support. Nancy Cruzan sustained brain injuries resulting in
a persistent vegetative state. 16 After it had become apparent
that Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental
faculties, her parents asked the hospital to terminate the artificial nutrition which sustained her.' 7 Medical personnel refused
to remove the artificial nutrition without a court order.' 8 The
state trial court found that there was a right under the state and
federal constitutions to refuse or to withdraw "death prolonging
20
procedures." 19 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed.
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to refuse
treatment.2 ' The Court noted that whether an individual's right
had been infringed by state action could only be determined by
considering competing state interests. 22 The Court found that a

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
Id.

14.

See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 3

(2d. ed. 1999), for a discussion of important state an federal cases.
15. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
16. Id. at 266.
17. Id. at 267.
18. Id. at 268
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 278. See also infra text accompanying notes 44-45, regarding the commonlaw right under the informed consent doctrine.
22. Id. at 280.
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state has legitimate interest in the protection and preservation
of human life and is not required to remain neutral in the face of
an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to
23
starve to death.
The Court held that under the Due Process Clause, a state
may require that an incompetent person's wish to have lifesupport withdrawn be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 24 In dicta, the Court indicated that in determining an incompetent person's right to withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, "a State may properly decline to make judgments
about the 'quality' of life that a particular person may enjoy, and
may simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected
25
interest of the individual."
The Court held that a state was not required to accept the
"substituted judgment" of close family members of a patient absent substantial proof that their views reflected the views of the
patient. 26 Thus, a competent person has a right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment, but a state can restrict the ability
of others to exercise that right on behalf of an incompetent person.
The Cruzan decision has led to an increase in the use of advanced directives, in which a person, while still competent, provides documentation that would fulfill the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard for proving his or her intent to refuse treatment should he or she later become incompetent. 27 Many states,
including Montana, 28 now have statutes providing for the use of
advance directives.
The Cruzan decision is a milestone in the evolution of legal
and social responses to changing patterns in the process of dying. In earlier times, sustaining life through the use of technology was simply not an issue because the technology did not exist. Over time we have witnessed dramatic advances in science
and medicine that have prolonged life and altered the process of
dying, resulting in unprecedented ethical and legal questions.
While Cruzan and subsequent cases have begun to address
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 282.
26. Id. at 286.
27. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 51. See also ROGER W. ANDERSON ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 7 (1996), for discussions of advance directives.

28.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(1) (2003); see also infra text accompanying note 211.
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these questions, others remain unanswered.
It is likely, however, that the need to address legal and social questions presented by a protracted dying process will become increasingly acute. In this new century, we will be faced
with an increasingly aged population. Economics provides one
measure of the significance of an aging population dying
through a prolonged process. The new patterns in dying are not
only more prolonged, they are also far more costly. Presently,
about twenty-seven percent of all Medicare expenditures are
used for the five to six percent of the beneficiaries who die each
year and about forty percent of these funds are spent in the last
month of life. 29 In this last month, Medicare expenditures are
twenty times higher than average monthly expenditures for
beneficiaries who are not in the last month of their life.30 We can
reasonably expect that over the coming decades a continually increasing proportion of individual and societal resources will be
spent on prolonging the last days of those who are terminally ill.
While economics should not be the deciding factor in determining the rights of the dying, the significance of changes in the
process of dying are clearly underscored by their economic impact.
C. Terminology
Discussions of the rights of the dying are often dominated
by the use of catch phrases and slogans such as "right to die,"
"death with dignity" and "physician-assisted suicide." While
these phrases serve as convenient short-hand for complex and
difficult concepts, they can be counter-productive. They have
the potential for conveying unintended connotations and creating unnecessary ambiguity. This section attempts to provide a
precise definition of these terms as used in this article, and to
alert the reader to the potential ambiguity in the use of these
terms by the courts and others.
In this article, "right to die" is broadly defined as all the
rights a terminally ill person may have in controlling the circumstances of death. Thus, the "right to die" includes, but is not
limited to, the right of a competent terminally ill person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment as set forth in Cruzan.

29. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 12-13.
30. MCBS Profiles, Last Year of Life Expenditures (May 2003), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcbs/mcbsprofiles/issuelO.pdf.
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The "right to die" may also include a right of a competent terminally ill person to hasten his or her death with medical assistance.
As defined for the purposes of this article, the "right to die"
is only a right that vests in a terminally ill person-any right
that a healthy person might have to take his or her own life is
outweighed by the state's compelling interest in the preservation
of life. Thus, any legitimate rights encompassed by the "right to
die" would arise because of the reduced state interest in preserving the remaining life of a terminally ill person and the increased justification of the terminally ill person to exercise the
right in order to avoid further suffering and indignity. Healthy
people can, and do, commit suicide without regard to whether
there is a right to do so. Thus, the existence of a right to take
one's life may be irrelevant to the outcome for a healthy individual. Often terminally ill individuals do not have access to the
instrumentalities required to hasten their own death and must
have assistance to do so. If assistance is required for the terminally ill person who wishes to hasten his or her death, the existence of a "right to die" is crucial to the realization of that wish.
The meaning of "death with dignity" in the context of the
Montana Constitution's individual dignity provision will be
taken up later in this article. For the purposes of initial discussion, "death with dignity" is broadly defined as a right to die in
as dignified a manner as the dying individual sees fit. Webster
defines dignity as being "the quality or state of being worthy,
honored or esteemed." 31 This dictionary definition fails to capture the meaning of dignity used here because it refers to how
others perceive or value a person, rather than how a person perceives him or herself in relation to others and his or her circumstances. In the context of this article, dignity is what the dying
individual defines it to be. Dignity arises from the individual's
sense of self. Both dignity and "death with dignity" are highly
personal, individual and situational.
This article uses the phrase "medically hastened dying"32 in
place of the more familiar phrase-"physician-assisted suicide"-for two reasons. First, the word "suicide" is well suited to
the description of a distraught individual with his whole life
ahead of him, who in a moment of despair, commits a completely
senseless and utterly tragic act. In contrast, "suicide" is not well

31.
32.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1995).
Similar language has occasionally been used by the courts. See, e.g., infra p. 16.
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suited to describe an elderly cancer patient who in the final days
of a horrible and agonizing struggle simply wishes to avoid more
needless suffering and indignity. The first individual's act destroys what could be a long and productive life. The elderly cancer patient does not extinguish the hope of a bright future, but
rather avoids the last uncharacteristically painful and undignified moments of a life already fully lived. From a constitutional
perspective, the state has a clear compelling interest in maintaining the productive life of the first individual, but it is less
clear that the state has a compelling interest in the last dying
days of the elderly cancer patient. Use of the word "suicide" is
avoided in this discussion because it arouses the images of tragic
loss of life in a situation where the tragedy may be the continuation of life.
The second reason for abandoning the phrase "physicianassisted suicide" is that it directs the focus towards the physician's action and away from the terminally ill individual's decision. This article focuses on the right of a terminally ill individual to hasten death. Medicine is only the most desirable of a
variety of methods that a terminally ill person might use to hasten death. The physician's dominant role in dispensing medicine is tangential to the central issue of the rights of the terminally ill individual. To frame the issue in the context of the
physician's role runs the risk of clouding the analysis of the terminally ill person's fundamental rights with ancillary issues of
whether a physician's assistance might offend traditional notions of medical ethics or a particular physician's religious or
philosophical sensibilities. The physician's professional or individual ethics are irrelevant since the terminally ill person could
simply opt to use a non-medical method to hasten his or her
death. While this article avoids the term "physician-assisted suicide," the use of this term by the courts will be preserved in the
following discussion.
II. LEGAL RIGHTS TO DIGNIFIED DEATH
A. The Common Law and Suicide
Although the debate about the scope of the "right to die" often hinges on constitutional considerations, state laws addressing suicide derive from common law that predates the United
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States Constitution and the various state constitutions. 33 In
English common law, the motivation for a suicide determined
the legal consequences. A person who committed suicide to
avoid criminal punishment forfeited all lands and chattels to the
king, leaving his heirs with nothing. 34 If the suicide was committed out of despair, the penalty was the forfeiture of chattels,
but not land. 35 In colonial America, English common law punishments for suicide were considered ineffective and were abandoned. 36 However, assisting suicide was not legal in common
law and has never been legal in this country.37 Currently, fortyfour states and the District of Columbia prohibit or condemn assisted suicide. 38 Six states regard assisted suicide as manslaughter; eighteen states regard suicide as a felony. 39 In Montana "aiding or soliciting" an attempted suicide is a felony
punishable by up to ten years in prison and a $50,000 fine, 40 and
assisting in a successful suicide may result in homicide
charges. 41 Oregon is the only state with a statute clearly affirm42
ing and regulating the right to medical assistance in dying.
Conversely, the right of an individual to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment has been found to derive from the
common law doctrine of informed consent 43 in addition to having
a constitutional basis. 4 As Justice Cardozo articulated in 1914:

33. See Fisk, supra note 5, at 310-12. See also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-17, for
general discussions of the common law of suicide.
34. Fisk, supra note 5, at 310.
35. Id. (citing Dwight G. Duncan & Peter Lubin, The Use and Abuse of History in
Compassion and Dying, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 175, 177 (1996)).
36. Id. at 311.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 312 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (1995) [hereinafter Compassion2]).
39. Id. (citing Laura Trenaman-Molin, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Should Texas be
Different?, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1475, 1492-93 (1997)).
40. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-105 (2003).
Aiding or soliciting suicide. (1) A person who purposely aids or solicits another
to commit suicide, but such suicide does not occur, commits the offense of aiding or soliciting a suicide. (2) A person convicted of the offense of aiding or soliciting a suicide shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed 10 years or be fined an amount not to exceed $50,000, or both.
41. See id. Criminal Law Commission Comments state that "[i]f the conduct of the
offender made him the agent of the death, the offense is criminal homicide notwithstanding the consent or even the solicitations of the victim." Id.
42. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880-897 (1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 20912.
43. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 14, at 19-20.
44. See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
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[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault."45 Thus, under common law, a patient can consent to,
or, conversely, refuse medical treatment. Since the patient can refuse treatment at any time, the patient can have treatment withdrawn even after it has been initiated.

While common law doctrines addressing aspects of the
"right to die" have survived the test of time, these doctrines may
now fail to adequately encompass the unprecedented issues arising out of medicine's increasing ability to delay and prolong the
dying process. To the extent that the common law, and the
statutes arising out of it, fail to adequately address emerging
aspects of the "right to die," society and the courts will have to
analyze these issues in light of fundamental rights provided by
the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the various states.
B. Rights under the United States Constitution
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan
marked an evolution in the rights of the dying in the United
States. Cruzan clearly established the right of a competent terminally ill patient to refuse or demand withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment. On June 16, 1997, the Court decided two
cases, Washington v. Glucksberg,46 and Vacco v. Quill,47 both of
which addressed whether a competent, terminally ill patient had
a right to affirmative medical assistance in hastening death. In
Glucksberg, the arguments primarily revolved around an analysis of liberty interests and in Vacco the focus was on an equal
protection analysis. In each case, the Court found that states
could prohibit a terminally ill person from obtaining medical assistance in hastening death.
1. Glucksberg
The Glucksberg decision arose from Compassion in Dying v.
Washington.48 Three terminally ill individuals, four physicians
who worked with dying patients and a nonprofit group, Compas-

45. Id. at 269 (citing Shloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
46. See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
47. See generally Vacco, 521 U.S. 793.

48. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) [hereinafter Compassion 1].

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2004

9

318

Montana Law Review, Vol. 65 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 4

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 65

sion in Dying, brought suit against the state of Washington
seeking a declaration that a Washington statute prohibiting assisted suicide49 violated the United States Constitution. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington declared that the statute violated the Constitution; 50 a
panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit reversed the Federal District Court;5 1 and the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc reversed the Ninth Circuit panel and affirmed the
district court 52. The United States Supreme Court ultimately
reversed the Ninth Circuit en bane decision and held that
"Washington's prohibition against 'causing' or 'aiding' a suicide"
did not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 53 The tortuous route
of the Compassion in Dying case through the courts illustrates
the difficulty in addressing the rights of terminally ill individuals to assistance in hastening death. A brief review of these
cases provides a summary of the legal arguments that have been
applied to this issue.
In Compassion 1, the district court held that the Washington statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against deprivation of rights by a state. 54 The court relied on
cases protecting "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and
education," and in particular relied on Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.55 The court quoted Casey, an abortion rights case, for the
proposition that there is a fundamental liberty interest in the
right to make deeply personal decisions:
[T]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed

49. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (2004) ( "(1) A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, (2)
Promoting a suicide attempt is a Class C felony.").
50. Compassion 1, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
51. See Compassion 2, 49 F.3d 586.
52. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
Compassion3].
53. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06.
54. Compassion 1, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
55. Id. at 1459 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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under compulsion of the State. 56

The district court found the "terminally ill person's choice to
commit suicide" was analogous to the right of a woman to abortion as protected by Casey in that it was one of the most intimate and personal choices that could be made in a lifetime and a
57
choice central to personal autonomy and dignity.
The district court highlighted the liberty interest in the re-

fusal of medical treatment found in Cruzan and indicated it did
not believe that a significant constitutional distinction could be
drawn "between refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and
physician-assisted suicide by an uncoerced, mentally competent,
terminally ill adult."58 Thus, relying on both Casey and Cruzan,
the district court concluded that a terminally ill person had a
protected liberty interest in the availability of assistance in hastening death and that the Washington statute created an undue
burden on the terminally ill person's liberty interest.
The district court also held the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that
all similarly situated persons be treated alike. 59 The court based
this holding on a Washington statute60 creating immunity for a
physician who withheld or withdrew treatment in accord with a
terminally ill patient's directives. 61 The district court saw no
constitutional distinction between a directive to withdraw or
withhold life support, and a request for affirmative assistance in
hastening death. 62 Accordingly, it found that protecting a physician withdrawing life support, but not protecting a physician
providing affirmative assistance with a similar result, was an
unequal application of the laws to similarly situated persons. 63
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found no basis for the district
court's conclusion that the Washington statute was unconstitutional. 64 The Ninth Circuit panel found the application of Casey
inappropriate. 65 It also found the district court erred in its inability to distinguish between affirmatively hastening the death

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
Id.
Id. at 1461.
Id. at 1467.

60.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122 (1994).

61. Compassion 1, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Compassion2, 49 F.3d at 590-94.
65. Id. at 590-91.
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of the terminally ill and the withdrawal or refusal of life support. 66 The court noted that the right to refuse medical treatment as set out in Cruzan derived from the more basic "right to
be let alone" and that the right to assistance in hastening death
was qualitatively different in that it required that an affirmative
act-an act that would result in the patient's death-rather
than simply removing technology that prolonged the natural
process of dying. 67 The court's decision relied heavily on a historical perspective and emphasized the scope of the state's interest in preserving life.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wright agreed with the district court that the liberty interest found in Casey was also implicated in the right of a terminally ill person to have assistance
in "hastening death."68 Wright analyzed the issue as a right to
privacy and concluded that the "right to die with dignity falls
squarely within the privacy rights recognized by the Supreme
Court."6 9 Wright also found that a "constitutional distinction
cannot be drawn between refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment and accepting physician assistance in hastening
death."70 Wright noted that the state's interest in preserving life
declines and the individual's right to privacy grows as natural
71
death approaches.
The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc, and Judge
Reinhart wrote the majority opinion. 72 In his eloquent introductory comments, Judge Reinhart noted the difficulty and significance of the issue before the court:
This case raises an extraordinarily important and difficult issue.
It compels us to address questions to which there are no easy or

66. Id. at 593-94.
67. Id. at 595 (Wright, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 595-96.
69. Id. at 595.
70. Compassion 2, 49 F.3d at 595 n.4. Judge Wright notes Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Cruzan:
Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple as
far as the common-law definition of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in
both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to put an end to his own existence.
Of course the common law rejected the action-inaction distinction in other contexts involving the taking of human life as well .... A physician ...could be
criminally liable for failure to provide care that could have extended the patient's life, even if death was immediately caused by the underlying disease
that the physician failed to treat.
Id. (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
71. Id. at 596.
72. See generally Compassion 3, 79 F.3d 790.
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simple answers, at law or otherwise. It requires us to confront the
most basic of human concerns-the mortality of self and loved
ones-and to balance the interest in preserving human life against
the desire to die peacefully and with dignity. People of good will
can and do passionately disagree about the proper result, perhaps
even more intensely than they part ways over the constitutionality
of restricting a woman's right to have an abortion. Heated though
the debate may be, we must determine whether and how the
United States Constitution applies to the controversy before us, a
controversy that may touch more people more profoundly than any
73
other issue the courts will face in the foreseeable future.

Judge Reinhart went on to concisely summarize the issue
before the court and the court's conclusions and holding:
Today, we are required to decide whether a person who is terminally ill has a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in hastening what might otherwise be a protracted, undignified, and extremely painful death. If such an interest exists, we must next
decide whether or not the state of Washington may constitutionally restrict its exercise by banning a form of medical assistance
that is frequently requested by terminally ill people who wish to
die. We first conclude that there is a constitutionally-protected
liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's own
death, an interest that must be weighed against the state's legitimate and countervailing interests, especially those that relate to
the preservation of human life. After balancing the competing interests, we conclude by answering the narrow question before us:
We hold that insofar as the Washington statute prohibits physicians from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally
ill, competent adults who wish to hasten their own deaths, it vio74
lates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In reversing the Ninth Circuit panel, the court specifically
rejected the panel's heavy reliance on historical analysis. 75 The
court concluded that "historical evidence alone is not a sufficient
basis for rejecting a claimed liberty interest," noting that if such
arguments were sufficient, statutes barring interracial marriages would still stand.76
By the time the Ninth Circuit reheard the case, the three
terminally ill plaintiffs had died from their illnesses. 77 The
court determined, however, that the physician-plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the statute. 78 The issue of standing was

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 793.
Id. at 793-94.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 796.
Compassion 3, 79 F.3d at 795-96.
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significant in that it highlighted one of the procedural barriers
to appellate review of cases dealing with the rights of the dying.
In these cases the person has often died before appeal, thus raising the question of whether the issue is moot and not justiciable.
By establishing the standing of the physicians, the court avoided
questions of mootness and, in effect, paved the way for review by
the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that a right to assistance in committing suicide was
not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, and that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was rationally related to legitimate government interests. 79 The opinion of the Court was lengthy, and while there was not a dissenting opinion, concurring opinions provided widely varied
analyses.8 0 Moreover, the concurring opinions discussed both
8
Glucksberg and the simultaneous decision in Vacco. 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was based on the
Court's "established method of substantive-due-process analysis"
with two primary features: 1) specially protecting those "fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted
in nation's history and tradition," and 2) providing careful description of asserted fundamental liberty interests.8 2 The majority's analysis began with an examination of "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" which demonstrates that
Anglo-American common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for over 700 years.8 3 Against this historical backdrop, Rehnquist noted the Court has "always been
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guide posts for responsible decision-making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended. 8 4 To expand due process rights in this context would "reverse centuries of legal
doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy of
choice of almost every State."8 5 After reviewing the Court's holdings in Casey and Cruzan, Rehnquist found the Court's previous
holding "[t]hat many of the rights and liberties protected by the

79. See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
80. The concurring opinion of Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer are
cited separately in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
81. See generally Vacco, 521 U.S. 793.
82. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
83. Id. at 710-19.
84. Id. at 720.
85. Id. at 723.
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Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy [did] not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate and personal decisions are so protected."8 6 After concluding that "committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause,"8 7 the majority
went on to conclude that the Washington ban on assisted suicide
was rationally related to legitimate state interests in preservation of human life, preventing suicide, maintaining integrity and
ethics of the medical profession, protecting vulnerable persons
who might be pressured into physician-assisted suicide, and protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes and societal indifference.88 Thus,
89
the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause.
Justice Souter began his concurring opinion with an extensive review of the Court's methods of substantive due process
analysis. 90 Applying a carefully considered analysis, Justice
Souter judged "the importance of the individual interest here, as
within that class of 'certain interests' demanding careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim."91 Justice Souter stopped
short, however, of addressing whether there was a "fundamental" right of the terminally ill to medical assistance in hastening
death. 92 Souter acknowledged that the patients and doctors
were asserting a more narrow and limited right than the majority had based its opinion on, 93 and that they had proposed regulatory schemes that would ostensibly mitigate many of the asserted state interests. 94 Souter found that legislatures, rather
than courts, were best suited to address the emerging issue of
the rights of the dying. 95 He suggested that a proper solution
may involve some experimentation which was improper for the
courts, but appropriate and desirable for the legislative
branch. 96 Souter concluded his concurring opinion by stating,
"[w]hile I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 724-28.
Id. at 728.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-35.
Id. at 735.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 752 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Id.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 788-89.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789.
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should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at
97
this time."
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that there was
no generalized right to commit suicide, but noted that the patients and doctors were asserting the narrower right of a competent person experiencing great suffering to control the circumstances of death. 98 Justice O'Connor concluded that the court
need not address the issue of whether a constitutional right was
implicated. The patients were not prevented from obtaining palliative care and the state's interest in safeguarding against involuntarily hastened death was sufficient to justify the Washington statute. 99
Justice Breyer, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed
with Justice O'Connor's views. 10 0 Breyer indicated that he
would reject the majority's formulation of the claimed liberty interest as a "right to commit suicide with assistance" and would
instead adopt a "formulation [that] would use words roughly like
'a right to die with dignity."' 1 1 At the "core" of this conception
"would lie personal control over the manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and
severe physical suffering-combined." 0 2 Like Justice O'Connor,
Justice Breyer indicated it was not necessary to determine if
this was a fundamental right in this case because the severe
physical suffering required to implicate the right could be alleviated with appropriate palliative care.'0 3 Justice Breyer made it
clear that under different circumstances, particularly those in
which state action limited palliative care, the court might have
04
to revisit the issue and establish the nature of the right.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, analyzed the
right of a terminally ill person to medical assistance in hastening death in the context of the Court's holdings on the use of
capital punishment by some states. 0 5 Stevens found that
states, like Washington, which had authorized the death penalty

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 737-38.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 791
Id. at 792.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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had done so on the premise that the sanctity of human life does
not always require that it be preserved and thus, the state
"must acknowledge that there are situations in which an inter10 6
est in hastening death is legitimate."
2. Vacco
In Vacco the Court considered whether a New York statute
banning physician-assisted suicide violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 0 7 Like Glucksburg,
Vacco was brought by terminally ill patients, who had died of
their illnesses by the time certiorari was granted, and by their
physicians. 0 8 The doctors and patients asserted that the New
York statute violated the Equal Protection Clause "because New
York permits a competent person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and because the refusal of such treatment is 'essentially the same thing' as physician-assisted suicide." 10 9
The United States District Court disagreed with the petitioners, stating, "it is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the
State to recognize a difference between allowing nature to take
its course, even in the most severe situations, and intentionally
using an artificial death-producing device." 110
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, stating:
New York law does not treat equally all competent persons who
are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their
deaths,' because 'those in the final stages of terminal illness who
are on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by
directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly
situated, except for previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs."1

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit."12 The Court found that the distinction between assisting
suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment was important, logical and rational. 1 3 The Court noted that the distinc-

106.
107.

Id. at 741-42.
Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 798.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing Quill v. Koppel, 870 F.Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
(citing Quill v. Koppel, 80 F.3d 716 (1996)).
at 799.
at 800-01.
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tion was "widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession" and comported with "fundamental legal principles of causation and intent."114 With regard to causation, the Court
pointed out that "when a patient refuses life sustaining medical
treatment, he dies of an underlying fatal disease," but "if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is
killed by that medication." 115 With regard to intent, the Court
noted that a physician who removes life-support at a patient's
request is not doing so with the intent of killing the patient,
while the intent in physician-assisted suicide is to end the pa16
tient's life."
The Court discussed the significance of a physician's intent
with regard to what has become known as the "double effect." 1 17
The "double effect" occurs when a physician provides painkilling drugs that "may hasten a patient's death, but the physician's purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient's
pain."" 18 The "double effect" situation is substantially different
from a doctor who assists a suicide and "must necessarily and
indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead."1 1 9
The Court concluded that the state's reasons for recognizing
and acting on the distinctions between withdrawal of lifesupport and affirmative acts that hasten death were "valid and
important public interests" which easily satisfied "the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a ra20
tional relation to some legitimate end."'
3. Conclusions Regarding FederalRights
Glucksberg and Vacco were significant as much for what
they did not do as for what they did. In these cases, the Court
found no right under the United States Constitution to commit
suicide.' 21 The Court, however, left open the possibility that in
the future a more narrow right might be recognized under the

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 801-02.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 802.
119. Id. (citingAssisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 368
(1996)).
120. Id. at 808-09.
121. See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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United States Constitution. 122 The Court also made it clear that
while there was no protected right to commit suicide under the
United States Constitution, states were free to legislate such a
right. 123 Moreover, the Court's decision did not preclude the possibility that the terminally ill person may have a right to medical assistance in hastening death which arises under a state's

constitution. 124
C. Rights Under the Montana Constitution
A state cannot abridge the rights afforded by the United
States Constitution. 25 A state is free, however, to expand those
rights. 26 The expansion of rights was the clear intent and effect
of the 1972 Montana Constitution. 27 Since the United States
Supreme Court has not, as yet, found that a terminally ill person has a right to assistance in hastening death, the question
arises as to whether such a right might exist within the more
expansive rights provided by the Montana Constitution. The
Montana Supreme Court has held that it "is not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court where independent
28
grounds exist for reaching a contrary result.'
The Montana Supreme Court has already eluded to the fact
that the right to privacy under the Montana Constitution may
have implications for the "right to die." In Gryczan v. State, a
case addressing same-gender sexual conduct, Chief Justice Turnage, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, noted that the
court should "not be surprised if one of the first challenges under
the theory espoused by the majority in this case will be to § 45-5105, MCA, which provides severe criminal sanctions for a person

122. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 735 n.24.
125. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution places federal law above state law. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land
126. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
127. VII MONT. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 3026-27 (1972) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPTS].
See generally LARRY ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2001).

128.

State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 314, 693 P.2d 518, 521 (1984).
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who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide."12 9
1. The Montana Constitution
The Montana Constitution, ratified in 1972, is one of the
most modern and innovate of constitutions. 130 It was created to
replace the outdated 1889 constitution and arose from a constitutional convention which was truly a convention of the people
and not the government.' 3 '
All of the convention's deliberations were open to the public
and there was little influence from lobbyists. 132 The delegates
obtained information from a staff of hired researchers, many of
whom were recent college graduates. 33 There were slightly
more Democratic delegates than Republican, but the convention
was notably nonpartisan. 13 4 Seating on the convention floor was
alphabetical rather than by party and committees were chaired
35
by members of both parties.1
The proceedings of the convention are documented nearly
verbatim in the Montana Constitutional Convention Transcripts
("Transcripts") and Delegate Proposals. Although the Montana
Constitution follows the general pattern of the United States
Constitution, the Transcripts make it clear that the delegates
intended to expand on the rights of individuals provided under
the United States Constitution. 136 Commentators have noted
that seventeen of the provisions of the Montana Constitution's
article II, declaration of rights have no parallel in the Bill of

129. Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433,458, 942 P.2d 112, 127 (1997).
130. See ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 127, for a detailed discussion of the Montana
Constitution.
131. Id. at 9-40. During the legislative authorization of the Constitutional Convention,
a question arose as to the meaning of article V, section 7, of the 1889 Constitution which
said: "No senator or representative shall, during the term for which he shall have been
elected, be appointed to any civil office under the state .. ." The Montana Supreme
Court interpreted this section as preventing current members of the legislature from
serving as delegates to the convention. Consequently, nearly all prominent state politicians were prevented from participating. Montana voters elected 100 convention delegates from diverse walks of life. Among the delegates were nineteen women, twenty
farmers or ranchers, twenty-four lawyers, thirteen educators including three professors,
a retired FBI agent, a Methodist minister, an architect, and a beekeeper. Id.
132. Id. at 22.
133. Id. at 19, 22.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 18, 20.
136. See, e.g., TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 127, at 3026-27.
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Rights of the United States Constitution. 137 At least two of
these, the right of privacy 138 and individual dignity 139 have implications for the right of the terminally ill to medical assistance
in hastening death.
As a new constitution with unprecedented explicit individual rights, the Montana Constitution is in many ways a mere
framework on which these new enumerated rights will be constructed. Many of the unique provisions, especially the individual dignity section, 140 will be filled with meaning by legislation
and court decisions. At this moment we can only speculate as to
how expansive the rights provided by the Montana Constitution
shall become. It is possible, however, that the Montana Constitution could provide the terminally ill in Montana rights to control death that have not been found under the United States
Constitution.
2. Right to Privacy, Scott Fisk'sAnalysis

14 1

There is no explicit right to privacy in the United States
Constitution. The right to privacy first arose as a principle of
common law. 42 By the 1960's a right to "observational" privacy
had been firmly established as a fundamental, if not explicitly
enumerated, constitutional right. 143 In Griswold v. Connecticut
and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the United States Supreme
Court found that there was a right to personal-autonomy privacy encompassing a right to personal choice. 44
Delegates of the Montana Constitutional convention felt
that the right of privacy was so important that it should be a

137. ELISON & SNYDER, supra not 127, at 35. See also volume 64 of the Montana Law
Review for a general discussion of the scope of the Montana Constitution.
138. MONT. CONST. art. II, §10.
139. MONT. CONST. art. II, §4.
140. Id.
141. Fisk, supra note 5, provides a thorough discussion of the right of privacy under
the Montana Constitution and its implications for terminally ill Montanans seeking assistance in hastening death. This section is primarily a brief summary of Fisk's arguments.
142. Id. at 319. Fisk notes that the right of privacy was first articulated in 1890 in an
article authored by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.
143. Id. at 319-20 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) as an example).
144. Id. at 320-21 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (a statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives impermissibly limited the privacy right of married persons), and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. V. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (an
abortion rights case)).
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right explicitly enumerated in the new constitution. 145 Since
ratification of the Montana Constitution containing an explicit
right to privacy section, the Montana Supreme Court has routinely distinguished the right to privacy under the Montana
Constitution from that found under the United States Constitution. 46 The Montana Supreme Court has stated: "We have chosen not to 'march lock-step' with the United States Supreme
Court ....
In addition, we have held that Montana's unique
constitutional language affords citizens [of Montana] a greater
1 47
right to privacy.'
In Gryczan, the Montana Supreme Court found a fundamental right to personal-autonomy privacy in the consensual
non-profit sexual conduct of adults. 148 Although the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in Gryczan made it clear that personal-autonomy privacy is a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution, the court did not define the scope of personalautonomy privacy.
To determine if an activity is covered by the right to privacy
the court applies the Katz test, which requires that "(1) a person
have an actual expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation
must be one society is willing to recognize as reasonable.""49 Fisk
argues that the Montana Supreme Court could include the pri15 0
vacy of the dying process within personal-autonomy privacy.
"In Montana, the right to privacy, in the personal autonomy
sense, seems intricately woven into the fabric of this state's cultural heritage."' 5' As District Judge Jeffrey M. Sherlock wrote
in his summary judgment order in the Gryczan case, "Montanans generally mind their own business and do not wish to restrict other people in their freedoms unless the exercise of those
freedoms interferes with other members of society."1 52 Fisk rea-

145. Id. at 321 (citing Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettickSimmons, Right of Privacy, 48
MONT. L. REV. 1 (1987)). Elison and NettickSimmons discussed the delegates unanimous agreement with Delegate Campbell's assessment that times had changed sufficiently that the right to privacy should be explicitly recognized.
146. Id. at 322.
147. Fisk, supra note 5, at 322. (citing State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 384, 901 P.2d
61, 75 (1995) (the court found an expectation of privacy in a private driveway outside the
curtilage of defendants cabin)).
148. Id. at 323-324 (citing Gryczan, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112).
149. Id. at 323 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
150. Id. at 327.
151. Id. at 328.
152. Id. (citing Gryczan v. State, No. BVD-93-1869 (D. Mont. Feb. 16, 1996) (order on
motions for summary judgment)).
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sons that, given Montana's traditions and culture, the Montana
Supreme Court could apply the Katz test and find that a terminally-ill person, who is suffering and near death, has an actual
expectation of privacy which is reasonably recognized by other
153
Montanans.
In Montana, legislation limiting an individual's right to privacy must be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to effectuate only that interest. 154 Fisk argues
that if the court found a right to personal-autonomy privacy in
dying, the current laws prohibiting assistance in hastening
death would be too broad and restrictive to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 55 As noted earlier, in Montana, "aiding or soliciting" an attempted suicide is a felony punishable by up to ten
years in prison and a $50,000 fine 156 and assisting in a success57
ful suicide may result in homicide charges.
Fisk concludes his argument by noting that, unlike the
situation of personal-autonomy privacy in the Gyczan case, a
recognition of a right of the terminally-ill to medical assistance
in hastening death will require more than simply "striking a bad
law" from the books. 5 8 Even supporters of the right of the terminally ill to assistance in hastening death agree that such a
right would be subject to reasonable regulation narrowly tailored to address the state's compelling interests. 15 9 Fisk suggests that Montana's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act' 60 and
Oregon's Death With Dignity Act' 6 ' provide models for workable
legislation.
3. Individual Dignity
The right of a terminally ill person to hasten death is often
referred to as the right to "death with dignity." The United
States Constitution does not mention dignity, nor has the
United States Supreme Court found that there is a right to dig-

153. Id.
154. Id. at 322. (citing State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 363, 934 P.2d 199, 202 (1997)).
155. Id.
156.

MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-105 (2003).

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-5-102 to 104 (2003).
Fisk, supra note 5, at 335.
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(1) (2003); see also infra text accompanying note 211.
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880-897 (2001); see also infra text accompanying note 212.
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nity or "death with dignity.' 1 62
While there is apparently no right to dignity under the
United States Constitution, there is unquestionably one under
article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution:
Individual Dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable.
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or
sex, culture, social origin
political rights on account of race, color, 163
or condition, or political or religious idea.
Article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution ("Individual Dignity") is distinguished from equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
that it explicitly expands equal protection by both extending the
protection to additional classes and by protecting against discrimination in private as well as public actions. More important
for the present discussion, it implies that the right to equal protection arises under a fundamental and "inviolable" right to "Individual Dignity." While it is clear that section 4 is intended to
expand on rights provided by the United States Constitution, it
is less clear what exactly is meant by a right to Individual Dignity.
What does individual dignity mean under the Montana Constitution? The Montana Supreme Court recently interpreted the
literal meaning of the Individual Dignity Clause in Walker v.
Montana.164 Additionally, Montana Constitutional Convention
Transcripts provide some insight into the framers' intent. The
following analysis of the meaning of Individual Dignity relies on
Walker, convention transcripts, usage in other legal contexts,
and usage within the context of article II, section 4.
In Walker, the Montana Supreme Court took the opportunity to give meaning to the Individual Dignity Clause. 165 The
court applied the dignity clause and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Montana Constitution in a situation

162. Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in Glucksberg noted that the issue was
not a right to suicide as analyzed by the majority, but rather a "right to die with dignity."
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789. See also, Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and
Human Dignity: States and the Local in Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 66
MONT. L. REv. 15 (2004).

163. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
164. 2003 MT 134, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872. See also, Albinger v. Harris, 2002 MT
118, 310 Mont 27, 48 P.3d 711.
165. 2003 MT 134, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872.
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assessing standards of prisoner treatment. 166 Despite Walker's
initial failure to cite to article II, section 4 in his argument to
the district court, 1 67 the Montana Supreme Court applied the
provision and interpreted the meaning of Individual Dignity.
The majority recognized the right to individual dignity as a "fundamental" right, which requires the "highest levels of scrutiny"
and the "highest levels of protection from the courts."'168 Under
this standard of review, the court stated that the "plain meaning
of the dignity clause commands that the intrinsic worth and the
basic humanity of persons may not be violated," 6 9 indicating the
right to dignity is a free standing, separate right equally protected for each individual. However, the court did not indicate
whether the separate, fundamental right to dignity is defined
pursuant to individual perception or by a societal standard reflecting state interests. Absent a judicial resolution, this issue
requires further analysis.
To some extent, the intent of the Montana Constitutional
Convention can be traced through the process followed by the
delegates. The drafting process began with the delegates' submission of proposals to the various committees. There were at
least six delegate proposals dealing with dignity or equal protection submitted to the Bill of Rights Committee. 170 The language
of Delegate Proposal No. 61 is very close to that finally adopted
as article II, section 4 and begins with the sentence: "The dignity
7
of the human being is inviolable.' '
Delegate Proposal No. 33 also addresses dignity but does
not do so in the context of equal protection. 72 It states: "The
rights of individual dignity, privacy and free expression being
essential to a the well-being of a free society, the state shall not
infringe upon these rights without the showing of a compelling
state interest.' 73 While Delegate Proposal No. 33 was not
adopted, it suggests that some delegates regarded individual
dignity as a right independent of equal protection.
While there was considerable discussion in the Convention

166. Id. IT 72-74.
167. Id. 1 96 (Grey, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
74.
169. Id.
82.
170. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DELEGATE PROPOSALS NOS. 32, 33, 50,
51, 61, 165. See I TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 127, at 126-27, 148-49, 161, 312.
171. I TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 127, at 161.
172. Id. at 127.
173. Id.
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of the scope of the equal protection provisions of article II, section 4, the significance of the dignity language was mentioned
only briefly. 174 In a discussion of the inclusion of private action
within the scope of equal protection, Delegate Dahood stated
that "[t]he intent of Section 4 is simply to provide that every individual in the State of Montana, as a citizen of this state, may
pursue his inalienable rights without having any shadows cast
upon his dignity through unwarranted discrimination.' 175 While
not defining dignity, Delegate Dahood's comment suggests that
a variety of "inalienable rights" may be implicated in protecting
the dignity of an individual and that "discrimination" is one
way, but perhaps not the only way, that the rights and, consequently, the dignity of an individual could be violated. Despite
supporting the Montana Supreme Court's determination that
dignity is a free-standing right, Delegate Dahood's comment and
the progression of the Montana Constitutional Convention
Transcripts do not indicate whether dignity is defined on an individual basis or according to societal standards.
Further interpretation of the legal meaning of dignity can
be gleaned from the use of the word in other legal contexts.
Many of the federal cases addressing the Right to Die have associated dignity with personal-autonomy liberty. In Glucksberg,
Justice Breyer indicated he would formulate the issue before the
Court in terms of "a right to die with dignity."'176 Citing Casey,
the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc stated in Compassion in Dying
that "the decision of how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a
choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy. 1 77 Referring
to the fundamental liberty interest in the right to make deeply
personal decisions, the Court in Casey said that "at the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
178
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
Justice O'Connor explained in Cruzan, that the ultimate question is whether sufficient justification exists for the intrusion by

174. V TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 127, at 1643.
175. Id.; see also Walker v. Montana, 2003 MT 134, 99, 316 Mont. 103, 99, 68 P.3d
872,
99 (Gray, J., dissenting) (asserting that Delegates Mansfield and Dahood's comments indicate the intent behind article II, section 4 was to "prohibit intrusion on a person's dignity through discrimination," and not to create a free-standing, separate dignity
right).
176. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 790.
177. Compassion 3, 79 F.3d at 813-14 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
178. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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the government into the realm of a person's "liberty, dignity, and
freedom." 179 Thus, in federal cases dignity is linked to autonomy
and liberty and is often referenced in extremely individualized
contexts. Legal scholars have examined both sides of the coin,
analyzing the meaning of the Individual Dignity Clause consistent with both individual and societal contexts.
Prior to Walker, legal scholars interpreted the meaning of
article II, section 4 as a right defined by both a societal standard
and by an individual standard. 8 0 Matthew Clifford and Thomas
Huff examined individual dignity in a societal context, consistent with Western political traditions, and concluded that the
scope of the dignity clause should be limited to serious violations
that "appeal to the shared public meaning of dignity.' 8' Conversely, Heinz Klug prefaces his interpretation of the Individual
Dignity Clause with the assumption that human dignity is a
purely individual trait with the potential to take constitutional
82
form in multiple ways.
Our analysis of the meaning of dignity in the context of article II, section 4 of the Montana Constitution starts with three
contextual observations: (i) dignity is individual; (ii) dignity is
related to the need for equal protection; and (iii) dignity is inviolable.
i.Dignity is individual.
The title of article II, section 4-Individual Dignity-has
important implications. That dignity is individual suggests each
individual may have his or her own definition of dignity and
that recognizing individual dignity requires a recognition of the
each person's uniqueness. This is consistent with Heinz Klug's
83
assumption that human dignity is a purely individual trait.
Clifford and Huff may not disagree that dignity is an individual
trait, but they would only give dignity constitutional meaning if
it is consistent with a shared public meaning. 184 According to

179. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289.
180. Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and
Scope of the Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible Applications, 61
MONT. L. REV. 301 (2000); Heinz Mug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution:
May Foreign JurisprudenceLead the Way to an Expanded Interpretation?,64 MONT. L.
REV. 133 (2003).
181. Clifford & Huff, supra note 180, at 328.
182. Klug,supra note 180, at 133, 136, 142-146.
183. Id. at 137.
184. Clifford and Huff, supra note 180, at 328.
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Kug, dignity as a classic individual right is subject to societal
interests, however individual dignity can also take constitutional form as a "separate constitutionally protected right."1 8 5 In
Montana, individual dignity is recognized as a separate, freestanding right by the Montana Supreme Court. 8 6 Defining dignity in accordance with the Montana Supreme Court and Kug's
analysis indicates Montana may define dignity pursuant to an
individual standard.
Defining individual dignity according to each individual's
personal definition has implications for the meaning of death
with dignity in Montana. For a death to be dignified it would
require a recognition of the dying person's individual conception
of dignity, respecting the individual's "intrinsic worth and basic
humanity.' 8 7 For some, a dignified death may involve struggling against death for as long as possible and at all costs. For
others, a dignified death may involve affirmatively hastening
death to avoid suffering or simply to avoid the loss of functions
required to enjoy life. If the definition of dignity is individual,
then a collective or consensus standard of dignity may not be
possible. Government, society, medicine, philosophy and religion
may be equally unable to provide a one-size-fits-all standard for
individual dignity in dying.
ii. Dignity is related to the need for equal protection.
The titling and introduction of an equal protection provision
with a right to dignity suggests that there is an intimate relationship between dignity and equal protection. 8 8 According to
Clifford and Huff, denying equal protection of the law based on
arbitrary classifications is one type of violation of human dignity. 18 9 Delegate Dahood's comment indicates that equal protection is necessary so "that every individual ...may pursue his
inalienable rights without having any shadows cast upon his
dignity."1 90 The equal protection provision of section 4 is unique
among the provisions in article II, the declaration of rights, because in addition to the free-standing right of dignity, it assures
that all the rights afforded one individual are provided equally

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Klug,supra note 180, at 143-145.
Walker, 1[82.
Id.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
Clifford & Huff, supra note 180, at 306.
V TRANScRIPTS, supra note 127, at 1643.
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to all other individuals. Consequently, it is an umbrella provision that encompasses the other rights. Delegate Dahood's comment suggests that discrimination against a person in any of
their unalienable rights "cast[s] a shadow" on their dignity. Clifford and Huff expand on this notion, stating: "Presumably anyone could experience such a violation of dignity, not just persons
who are members of protected classes." 191
Thus, it appears that dignity is a quality of individual human beings that is protected by their unalienable rights, and
that the dignity of each individual should be equally protected.
Consistent with Walker, the fundamental right may underlie a
variety of other substantive rights such as the rights of privacy
or freedom of expression.
iii. Dignity is inviolable.
Article II, section 4 starts by stating that the "dignity of the
human being is inviolable." Classification of a right as inviolable is unprecedented in the constitutions of both Montana and
the United States. No other right is characterized as inviolable.
Webster defines inviolable as: "secure from violation, assault, or
trespass, unassailable.' 1 92 Under both the Montana Constitution
and the United States Constitution, even fundamental rights
are assailable and must be weighed against compelling state interests. 193 The language of article II, section 4 suggests that
human dignity need not yield even to a compelling state interest. The Montana Supreme Court recognizes individual dignity
as a free-standing right, but the court has yet to determine if
this right is subject to compelling state interest.
It is likely that the Montana Supreme Court would take a
different approach than the United States Supreme Court in
analyzing the right of a terminally ill person to assistance in
hastening their death. The analysis of the majority in Glucksberg was based largely on a recognition of time-honored social
and legal conventions. 94 The Montana Constitution was drafted
with explicit acknowledgment of the changes which have occurred in the past century and with the clear intention to replace obsolete legal concepts. 95 While the United States Su191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Clifford & Huff, supra note 180, at 306-7.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1995).
See, e.g., State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997).
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
See generally Elison & NettickSimmons, supra note 145.
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preme Court in Glucksberg looked to the past for its analysis,
the Montana Supreme Court, addressing the same issue, will be
basing its decisions on a constitution which exists because the
ways of the past were found to have become outmoded and inadequate. Thus, the historical analysis used by the majority in
Glucksberg would likely be rejected by a Montana Supreme
Court analyzing the right of a terminally ill Montanan to receive
assistance in hastening death.
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court noted that "a
state may properly decline to make judgments about the quality
of life that a particular person may enjoy and may simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the
person.' ' 9 6 In Montana, the existence of an inviolable right to
dignity would likely mean that the state is obligated to consider
an individual's quality of life to the extent it affects the individual's dignity. Thus, the state's interest in preservation of life in
Montana is not unqualified, but rather must recognize individual dignity.
In their concurring opinions in Glucksberg, both Justice
O'Connor 197 and Justice Breyer19 8 indicated it was not necessary
to determine if a fundamental right was implicated in the right
of a terminally ill person to obtain assistance in hastening death
because the severe physical suffering required to implicate the
right could be alleviated with appropriate palliative care. Thus,
at least some members of the United States Supreme Court
have found that the terminally ill have no fundamental right to
assistance in hastening death because medication is able to
ameliorate their pain. 99 It is likely a similar analysis would fail
in Montana because of the inviolable right to human dignity under the Montana Constitution. If dignity is individual, dignity
for some may be more than the mere absence of pain. Thus, a
Montana court could not dismiss the implication of a fundamental right simply because pain relief is available. It is easy to
imagine a dying person whose pain has been relieved, but who
has lost control of the most basic of bodily functions and feels
that prolonging life in that state is profoundly undignified.
Despite the uncertainty about the precise meaning of the

196. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282.
197. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737-38.
198. Id. at 791.
199. Id.
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right to individual dignity in Montana, it may be as important
as the right to privacy in supporting the right of a terminally ill
person to medical assistance in hastening death. In several
ways the right to privacy may be more vulnerable to attack than
the right to individual dignity. As Fisk noted, privacy interests
are subject to the two part Katz test. 200 Under the Katz test an
individual must have an actual expectation of privacy and the
expectation must be one society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 201 Many Montanans might find that the use of medical
assistance to hasten the death of the terminally ill person is unreasonable. If the right to medical assistance in hastening death
arose under a right to individual dignity, it would likely be
based on an individual standard, rather than on a societal reasonableness standard. The disapproval of a segment of society
would probably not be relevant if the analysis was based on a
right to individual dignity.
If the right of a terminally ill person to medical assistance
in hastening death arose under the right to privacy, that right
might still be outweighed by compelling state interests. The description of individual dignity as inviolable makes it less likely it
would be outweighed by a competing state interest. Thus, a terminally ill person's assertion of a right to assistance in hastening death may be more likely to succeed under the right to individual dignity than under the right to privacy.
While the right of a terminally ill Montanan to medical assistance in hastening death remains speculative, it is likely that
the issue will be brought before Montana courts. Our increasingly aging population and evolving legal and social perspectives
on dying make it highly likely that a terminally ill Montanan
will eventually assert his or her right to assistance in hastening
death. If such an assertion arises under the right to individual
dignity, the court likely will find current laws too broad and too
restrictive to withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, as
Fisk noted in his analysis under the right to privacy, even those
who support the right of the terminally ill to assistance in hastening death agree that such a right would be subject to reasonable regulation narrowly tailored to address the state's compel20 2
ling interests.

200. Fisk, supra note 5, at 323 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 335.
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III. CONCLUSION
The United States has an increasingly aging population.
The deaths of aging Americans will typically be characterized by
prolonged chronic illness. Many Americans will likely seek assistance in hastening their deaths by either the removal of lifesupporting technologies or by the administration of drugs intended to hasten death. In Cruzan, the United States Supreme
Court found that the terminally ill have a right to hasten death
20 3 In Glucksberg20 4 and Vacco, 20 5
by the removal of life-support.
the Court found that under the United States Constitution,
there was no fundamental right to "commit suicide." However,
the Supreme Court did not preclude the possibility that the terminally ill may have a right to medical assistance in hastening
death under state law.
The Montana Constitution provides Montanans with rights
beyond those provided by the United States Constitution. Two
of these rights, individual dignity and the right to privacy, could
potentially provide terminally ill Montanans a right to medical
assistance in hastening death. If this proves to be the case, existing Montana laws, which criminalize assisted suicide, may be
found to be too broad and restrictive to pass the strict scrutiny
test of constitutionality.
As Fisk noted in his analysis of the right to privacy, both
opponents and proponents agree that any right to medical assistance in hastening death should be carefully regulated. Fisk
proposed that Montana's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 20 6 and
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act 20 7 provide models for legislation that would allow Montanans to exercise rights to control the
circumstances of their death and at the same time address the
state's compelling interest. Often discussed are the state's interests in prevention of hastening the death of persons who are not
fully competent, who are depressed, or who have been pressured
by others into the decision to hasten death. 20 8 It is worth noting
that not only are these situations in which the state has a valid
interest, they are also situations in which, arguably, the terminally ill person is unable to competently choose to exercise his or

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
See generally Vacco, 521 U.S. 793.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-101 (2003).
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880-.897 (2001).
See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-35.
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her right.
Montana's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act assures that
withdrawal of life-support occurs only as the result of the terminally ill person making a considered and documented decision:
(1) the individual must be of sound mind; (2) at least 18 years-old;
(3) have a diagnosed incurable condition; (4) will in the opinion of
an attending physician die without the administration of lifesustaining treatment; and (5) the declaration may be revoked at
any time.209

Oregon's Death with Dignity Act provides for the hastening
of death with prescribed medication under carefully circumscribed conditions by requiring:
(1) the person must be at least 18 years-old; (2) the request for lifeending medication must be voluntary; (3) a 15-day waiting period
between a patient's first request for a lethal prescription and the
time the pills can be obtained from a pharmacist; (4) before the
prescription can be written, two doctors reasonably determine that
the patient has less than six months to live; and (6) no medication
to end a patient's life may be prescribed until it is determined that
the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological dis210
order, or depression causing impaired judgment.

Given the possibility that Montana's current laws restricting assisted suicide may be challenged and fail to survive constitutional scrutiny, it may be prudent for the people of Montana to
consider legislation that would provide reasonable and constitutionally acceptable regulation of a terminally ill Montanan's
right to medical assistance in hastening death. Montana could
accomplish this by expanding the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act with provisions similar to those of Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act.

209.
210.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-102 to 105 (2003).
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.880-.897 (2001).
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